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“Waiting for the Sages of Later Generations”:  
Is there a Rhetoric of Treason in the Shiji?
Dorothee Schaab-Hanke
Introduction
While allusions per se are, of course, legion in the text of the Shiji (“The Scribe’s Record”), a comprehensive historiographical work inalized around 86 
BCE, 1 the case example to be adduced here seems to be of particular interest in 
the context of the focus on “rhetoric as a political tool.” As will be argued, the use 
of this allusion reveals much about the attitude of the Shiji’s two authors, or at least of one of them, towards Emperor Wu (r. 141-87), the emperor under which 
Sima Tan (?-110) and his son, Sima Qian (ca 145-ca 86), 2 served successively 
in the position of “Director the Grand Scribe” (taishi ling). 3All ive passages where that allusion occurs have in common that they refer to one speciic passage of the Gongyang zhuan, one of the three earliest 
transmitted texts commenting or, to put it more precisely, interpreting the “Spring 
and Autumn” Annals (Chunqiu), a terse chronicle of the state of Lu, spanning 
1. All dates are BCE unless indicated otherwise. For the revised version of my paper, I 
am much indebted to the members of the editing team and the most helpful suggestions by Yuri Pines, Joachim Gentz, Michael Nylan, Steve Durrant, and two anonymous 
reviewers.
2. In spite of the suggested dual authorship of the Shiji I will, until the last section of this 
essay, merely speak of “the author” or “the histo rio grapher,” assuming that it is always 
the voice of one of them which is speaking to us at a time. In the last section, however, 
it will be argued that in the examples adduced here the voice of either Sima Tan 司馬
談 or Sima Qian 司馬遷 may be distinguished quite clearly.
3. Since the duties of a taishi ling ཚ史Ԕ covered the realm of astronomy as well as that of astrology, it is not easy to translate satisfactorily. Michael Nylan (1998-1999: 203) 
proposes to render taishi ཚ史 as “senior archivist,” but since an archivist’s role seems to 
be merely one aspect of the many duties of a taishi I prefer to stick to the more general 
term “Grand Scribe.”
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the years from 722 to 481, the so-called Spring and Autumn Period. 4 In that 
passage Confucius is reported to have lost hope that a sage ruler might appear 
during his own lifetime, shortly after a unicorn had been caught. As a reaction 
to this, he decided to devote his work, the Chunqiu, in which the moral rules 
governing the relations between the states of that period are laid down, to 
sages and superior men of later generations. 5 Very similarly, the Shiji author in those ive passages of his text addresses the sages and superior men of later 
generations, expressing his hope that they might make use of the work he had 
compiled and left for posterity. 6As I will argue, each of the ive passages in which the historiographer thus 
alludes to the Gongyang zhuan adds one facet to an overall critical assessment of Emperor Wu (r. 141-87). 7 And what is more, it will be argued that the 
temporal aspect characteristic of both the Gongyang zhuan prototype and the 
historiographer’s allusion to it implies that the critical attitude displayed was in both cases not merely a warning, but rather a inal condemnation—small 
wonder that someone who expressed such criticism easily incurred the risk of 
being charged with having committed lèse majesté, in other words, high treason. 8
4. Hereafter, references to the Gongyang zhuan ޜ羊傳, as well as to the Guliang zhuan 
穀梁傳 and Zuozhuan 左傳, will be made as to the ICS edition.
5. To my knowledge, there are few studies so far that have examined the impact of the 
Gongyang zhuan on the Shiji author in detail. Among Chinese Shiji specialists, attention 
on the Shiji as an exegetical work has increased within the last decade, the perhaps most pioneering being that of Chen Tongsheng (1995), who painstakingly traced the impact of 
all three exegetical commentaries of the Chunqiu on the Shiji. Among Western studies, Jurij L. Kroll (1976), in an essay on the Shiji as a literary work, has already pointed out 
that the Gongyang tradition was of major importance for the judgements passed by the 
author of the Shiji.6. It is important to add that all ive passages in which this allusion occurs are part of the 
historiographer’s personal remarks, which are usually introduced by the formula “His 
Lord the Grand Scribe says” (taishigong yue).7. Although the focus of this study is on the relations between the Shiji and the Gongyang 
zhuan, this is, of course, in no way meant to belittle the impact that the Zuozhuan had 
on large parts of the Shiji. For an insightful study of Shiji chap. 14 in which the table 
entries are interpreted as often being a synopsis of positions taken by the Zuozhuan, see Durrant (1992); see also Hardy (1993). For a discussion of the various exegetical 
positions taken by the Shiji author in the context of the comments introduced by “A superior man said” (junzi yue 君子曰), see Schaab-Hanke (2010a).8. The choice of the term “rhetoric of treason” for the allusion under discussion here was inspired by the intriguing essay by Gary Arbuckle (1995) in which he illustrates how, by 
applying doctrines of the Gongyang school on the politics of his time, the Han scholar 
Dong Zhongshu, as well as scholars in his succession, was almost inevitably charged 
with high treason.
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In a first step, the relevant passage of the Gongyang zhuan will be examined and compared with the ive related passages in the Shiji text; then, 
the historiographer’s personal remarks containing the allusions to the Gongyang 
zhuan will be analyzed within the context of the given chapters; the third step 
will be to illustrate how the allusion to the Gongyang zhuan is used here as a tool to pass a inal judgment on Emperor Wu rather than to simply warn him; 
closely related to this is the fourth step, in which the question of Emperor Wu’s 
sagacity is discussed in the Shiji; and, last but not least, the question of “the 
historiographer’s” identity will be raised.
1. The relevant passage in the Gongyang zhuan  and the ive related passages in the Shiji
The passage in the Gongyang zhuan which is the focus of our interest here 
appears in the very last section of the transmitted text. Commenting on the 
Chunqiu entry related to the 14th year of Duke Ai of the state of Lu (481) which 
records that a unicorn had been caught during a hunt somewhere to the west of 
the Lu capital, Qufu, the author of the Gongyang zhuan asks why this record 
was made in the Chunqiu. Upon hearing of the capture of the unicorn, Confucius 
reportedly “rolled up his sleeves and wiped off his tears” and lamented that his 
way had come to an end. Then, the author of the Gongyang zhuan relects on 
the question why the “superior man” (Confucius) compiled the Chunqiu. Was it 
because he was of the opinion that in a world full of chaos and decline, there was 
no better way to manage the crisis than by applying the rules of the Chunqiu? Or was it simply because the Master himself took delight in the way in which Yao recognized Shun? 9 While in his interpretation the author of the Gongyang 
zhuan seems to hesitate about what may have been the primary motivating 
force for Confucius to compile the Chunqiu, in his inal statement he turns his 
attention away from the age in which Confucius lived toward a point in time 
somewhere in the future when sages and superior men would live and to whom 
Confucius addressed his work on “Spring and Autumn” (zhi Chunqiu). The book ends with the words:
Indeed, he (= Confucius) applied the moral rules of the “Spring and Autumn (Annals)” to wait for sages of later (generations); it was for superior men that (this work) was 
made, and this is also something that he took delight in. 10
9. Many thanks to Yuri Pines who alerted me that this passage refers to the idea of Yao’s 
abdicating in favor of Shun (communication of 15.02.12).
10. Gongyang zhuan 12.14.1 (158/13-15): 制春秋之義，ԕ؏ᖼ聖。ԕ君子之為，亦有
樂乎此也。Cf. Gentz 2001: 89-92.
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Apart from the Gongyang zhuan, both the Zuozhuan and the Guliang zhuan 
also comment on this event. While the Zuozhuan mentions the incident only briely, explaining that the driver of a carriage had discovered the animal and, fearing it could be inauspicious, brought it to Confucius who identiied it as a 
unicorn, the Gu liang zhuan interprets it as an auspicious animal. The author 
of the Gong yang zhuan not only devotes the most attention to the capture of the unicorn, but he is also the only one to relect upon the relation between the 
appearance of the unicorn and its possible impact on Confucius and his work. 11Let us now take a irst look at the ive passages in the Shiji that contain 
allusions to the above mentioned passage in the Gongyang zhuan and the way 
they are formulated. Listed according to the sequence of chapters in the Shiji these passages appear in chapters 12, 15, 18, 28 and 130 of the transmitted text. 
Each of these passages is part of the section introduced by the formula “His Lord 
the Grand Scribe says” (taishigong yue), the historiographer’s personal remarks, 
usually found at the end, but at times also at the beginning of a chapter. 12In two of these ive passages, the allusion is formulated as follows: “If there 
will be superior men later on, they may make use of it for their examination.” 13 This formula is only slightly varied in two further passages: “If there will be 
superior men later on, they may make use of this for their examination and peruse,” and: “If there will be superior men later on who want to add their 
own discussions accordingly, they may make use of this (material) for their 
examination.” 14 The ifth passage contains the allusion that from its very wording 
comes closest to Confucius’ statement as it is recorded in the Gongyang zhuan. 
It is there that the historiographer says that the “Book of His Lord, the Grand 
Scribe” (taishigong shu) should “wait for the sages and superior men of later 
generations.” 15
2. Closer analysis of the ive Shiji passages in their context
After having examined the context of the Gongyang zhuan passage and 
having compared the wording of that passage with the related passages in the 
11. For the comments on Aigong 14.1 made in Zuozhuan, see B12.14.1/456/21-22; for those 
in Guliang zhuan, see 12.14.1/154/3-4. See also the comparison made by Gentz 2001: 288f.
12. For a closer study of the authority represented by the formula taishigong yue ཚ史ޜ
曰, see Li Wai-yee 1994.
13. Shiji 12.486 and 28.1404: ᖼ有君子，得ԕ覽焉。
14. Shiji 15.687, 4: ᖼ有君子，ԕ覽觀焉。Shiji 18.878, 10: ᖼ有君子，欲推而列之，
得ԕ覽焉。
15. Shiji 130.3319: 15-3320: 1: 為ཚ史ޜ書，ǒ…Ǔ，؏ᖼ世聖人君子。 
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Shiji, a closer look will be taken at the overall context of each of these ive 
Shiji passages, following the order in which these passages occur in that work.
2.1. Tracing the “irst signs of transgression” in the early state of Qin
Shiji 15, the “Table by Years of the Six States,” can be roughly summarized as treating the historical events between the year 475 and the year 207, from the time when the state of Qin was founded, until the inal downfall of the short-lived Qin dynasty, in all 270 years. 16
In the table, we have strictly speaking eight partners listed in the grid, beginning with Zhou in the upper horizontal row, followed by Qin in the second row, and Wei, Han, Zhao, Chu, Yan, and Qi in the next rows; however, as the 
title “Six States” already indicates, both Zhou and Qin are not reckoned among the others, since Zhou was the—increasingly weak—center, while Qin was the 
newcomer, whose development in relation to the other states of that period is 
spotlighted in this chapter.In some respects, the content of the table is a synopsis of chapters 5 and 6 of 
the Shiji. In the annals section the history of Qin is bipartite, the irst part tracing 
the history of the state of Qin in its interactions with the other regional states and the second part dealing with Qin after its uniication of the empire until the 
downfall of the Qin dynasty. The table in chapter 15, however, shows all the 
important information on the political history of these times in chronological 
order. The table thus perfectly mirrors how the center of power shifted in the course of these years: The weakening of Zhou is indicated by the fact that after the year in which Zhou King Nan died (indicated by the Zhonghua editors as the year 256) there are no more entries in the upper row, 17 and from the year 246 
on, the year in which Prince Zheng, King of Qin, came to the throne, there is 
no row reserved for Zhou. Instead, Qin has taken its place. 18 From 220 on, the table changes even more radically. There are no more horizontal rows from this 
point on, but only one vertical table which comprises all major events relating 
to the united empire of Qin. 19
The content of the historiographer’s personal remarks right at the beginning of the chapter can be roughly summarized as giving a brief survey of the route taken by the state of Qin from its irst appearance as a “small and remote” state 
toward a powerful state which, after having swallowed up one state after the 
16. Shiji 15.685-758 (“Liuguo nianbiao” ޝ國年表).17. See Shiji 15.748: 2.18. See Shiji 15.751: 3.19. See Shiji 15.757: 7.
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other, inally succeeded in establishing its rule over the whole empire. 20 While 
basing his account primarily on the records of the state of Qin itself, the Shiji 
author laments that he was forced to do so because the Qin had destroyed the 
annals of all the other states. 21His account deals with how the state of Qin irst appeared in history, traces 
the development of this state, and describes how Qin eventually swallowed up 
one state after the other, until by 221, after unifying the empire under one central 
rule, the Qin were able to announce their own dynasty, which he continues to outline through the short period of this empire until its fall in 207. This is how the historiographer’s personal remarks end:
Thus, basing myself on the records of Qin, following in the footsteps of the Chunqiu, 
beginning with King Yuan of Zhou, I have made a table of the events in the time of the Six States, comprising altogether 270 years; and I have written down all that I have heard concerning the irst signs of prosperity and decay. 22 If there will be 
superior men in future generations, they may make use of this (material) for their 
examination and research. 23
The historiographer’s personal attitude towards the Qin state’s rise to power in 
this chapter is rather ambiguous. On the one hand he seems to have been quite impressed by the way the Qin managed to change with the times and thus ind strategies not only for survival but for becoming the ittest of the Warring States 
period. While he does not seem convinced that the Qin had special advantages 
20. Zhang Dake 2000: 405, has counted altogether 196 armed conlicts between states in the time before the uniication of the empire by the Qin.
21. Yuri Pines (2005/2006) certainly justly reproaches the Shiji for being a biased source 
in many respects. However, in my view, this is an example where the historiographer 
explicitly points out that the annals of Qin were his only major source, which he bemoans, 
and on the other hand the tables themselves show that the historiographer had devoted 
great energy to recording the events of each of the states of the Warring States period 
separately, in spite of or even against the grain of this certainly highly biased source, 
so that I think the historiographer in cases such as this deserves some respect.
22. The term duan 端, “beginning,” or, as rendered here, “irst signs,” occurs conspicuously 
often in the Chunqiu fanlu 春秋繁露 (Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn [Annals]), a text ascribed to Dong Zhongshu who received an oficial chair under Emperor Wu. See, 
e.g., the phrase “cun wang zhi duan bu ke bu zhi ye” ᆈ亡之端不可不知也 (“It is of utmost importance that one understands the irst signs of [what brings about] continuity or perdition!”) in a section entitled “Mie guo” 滅國 (Destroying a state). See Chunqiu 
fanlu (ICS ed.) 5.1/19/13. I owe this hint to the importance of that term for the Han interpretation of the Gongyang school to Joachim Gentz, communication of 07.07.2011.
23. Shiji 15.687, 3-4: 余於是因秦記，踵春秋之ᖼ，起周元王，表ޝ國時һ，訖Ҽ世，
凡Ҽ百七十年，著諸所聞㠸壞之端。ᖼ有君子，ԕ覽觀焉。Cf. Chavannes 1898: 22-28; Watson 1958: 184ff.
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—be they strategic or geographic, he assumes that Qin must have been favored 
with Heaven’s blessing. On the other hand, in the author’s account throughout 
this chapter there is a critical undertone, namely that the Qin always tended 
towards violence and usurpation, so that a “superior man would be frightened.” 24 
Thus, in my opinion, the historiographer’s overall attitude towards the Qin is 
rather a critical one.
Right from the beginning, the Shiji author attributes to them a certain trait 
of arrogance in usurping privileges which would have been the prerogative 
of the Son of Heaven, then still represented by the Zhou. The Qin conducted sacriices, which were not appropriate to their status, and by conceding these 
to the Qin, the Zhou’s increasing weakness became more and more apparent. This is what the historiographer denotes as the “irst signs of transgression” 
which thus became noticeable. 25 Very similarly, by referring to “irst signs of 
prosperity and decay” (xing shuai zhi duan), the historiographer, not without a critical undertone, describes how the early Qin rulers had irst achieved their 
unexpectedly rapid success in unifying the empire and how the rulers of the uniied empire then, even more quickly, brought about their own ruin.
There is thus little doubt that the Shiji author takes the development of Qin, 
which was initially successful but soon doomed to fail, as the historical lesson which his readers—superior men of later ages—should learn and apply in later 
generations to their own circumstances. And the question to be raised here is 
whether the historiographer indirectly accuses the emperor of his own time, 
Emperor Wu, of showing similar traits of arrogance and violence in expanding 
his empire and assuring his recognition as the ruler of “All under Heaven.” 26
2.2. Criticizing Emperor Wu for his abolishment of so many iefs
The content of Shiji 18, “Table by Years of Marquisates Conferred on Meritorious Followers of Gaozu,” 27 is more easily understood if one takes a 
glimpse at the content of the preceding chapter and of the two following it. While chap. 17 is devoted to all nobles (hou) who had been made kings since 
24. Junzi ju yan 君子懼焉, see Shiji 15.685: 8.
25. Qianduan xian yi 僭端見矣, see Shiji 15.685: 7. In rendering the term qian 僭 with “trans gres sion” I follow the translation proposed by Yuri Pines 2005/2006: 12.26. For an earlier study on the—conspicuously quite similar—portrayals of Emperor 
Wu of the Han and the First Qin Emperor, especially as regards their desire to attain immortality, see Durrant 1994. In a forthcoming essay, Hans van Ess also points to the 
close resemblance of the pictures of both emperors as they were drawn by the Shiji 
author. I am obliged to Yuri Pines for directing my attention to the latter essay.27. Shiji 18.877-975 (“Gaozu gongchen houzhe nianbiao” 高祖࣏臣侯者年表).
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the rise of the Han, chap. 19 concentrates on the creation of nobilities 28 during 
the reigns of the Emperors Hui to Jing, (i.e., from 194 to 141), while chap. 20 is 
devoted to the nobilities newly created from the reign of Emperor Wu on (i.e., 
beginning with the year 140).The horizontal axis of the table contained in chap. 18 lists the names of the 
areas that had been bestowed on these meritorious ministers during the reign of the dynasty founder Liu Bang, posthumously Gaozu. The columns on its vertical axis indicate the name of the irst holder, the reason why he had been 
bestowed, followed by the reign years of all emperors down to Emperor Wu.
In his personal remarks, again found at the beginning of the chapter, the historiographer sets out to list ive different types of merits for which oficials were bestowed with marquisates in ancient times, and he emphasizes the overriding importance of the preservation of the iefs over generations to their 
owners.
He then turns his attention to the more than one hundred of the dynasty founder’s followers to whom Liu Bang bestowed iefs in reward for their merits 
during the rise of the new dynasty. He describes how these domains grew both in 
power and wealth, in accordance with their population growth, and that over the 
generations the descendants of these marquises became more and more arrogant.
As a consequence, the historiographer continues, by the beginning of the era of Taichu [Grand Inception], only ive of the descendants of these marquises were still able to preserve their iefs. 29 As for the rest, he continues, most of them were deprived of their iefs because they had violated the law and thus lost their 
lives, and the nobilities were thus abolished. Certainly, the historiographer adds, 
the laws of the empire by this time had become somewhat stricter than earlier, 
but others say that they did not really strive to accommodate the restrictions 
of the times.The historiographer concludes with the words:
Living in the present age, one’s intentions should be directed to the ways of old, in 
order to have a mirror for oneself, but the ages are still not wholly comparable. The 
emperors and kings all differ as regards the moral rules (one has to apply) and vary as regards the duties (one has to fulil); thus, making “merit” one’s standard, how 
should one not intermingle these?
28. In my use of the term hou 侯, “nobility” with regard to the iefs bestowed on meritorious oficials, I follow the terminology proposed by Michael Loewe (2004) in a section focused on “The Nobilites of the Western Han.” On p. 284, he writes, “Conferred by 
imperial decree, a nobility gave the recipient a title in the form of designating the area 
in which he was entitled and obliged to raise taxation and call up those of the inhabitants 
who were liable to render service, either in the armed forces or as conscript labourers.”29. Shiji 18.878: 2.
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If one takes a look at the reasons that brought them honor and those that brought them shame, one will see that there is also a whole forest of merits and deiciencies in our present age—how would one have heard about them in former times!
Therefore, I have meticulously traced the matters from their beginnings to their ends, listed what has been recorded of them; as for those matters that could not 
thoroughly be traced, I noted down what was documented and left out what is up to 
doubt. If there will be superior men of later (generations) who want to add their own 
discussions accordingly, they may make use of this material for their examination. 30
But what is the lesson that “superior men of later (generations)” should learn from this chapter? It seems that there are mainly two aspects: irstly, that during the reign of Em peror Wu, many of those iefs that had been established under Gao zu were conspicuously abolished; and secondly, that during Emperor 
Wu’s reign the rules regarding what was meritorious and what was not became so complicated that it was increasing ly dificult for the marquises to preserve 
the domains that they had inherited from their ancestors. Both aspects will be 
examined by taking a closer look at the table itself.
Tracing the number of nobilities abolished during the reigns of the Han 
emperors as indicated in the table, one can indeed observe that the domains 
abolished under Emperor Wu by far exceed the closures during the reigns of the emperors preceding him. Of all the 143 nobilities bestowed by Emperor Gaozu on meritorious oficials, only ive had been abolished during his own reign, two 
further under the reign of Emperor Hui, nine during the reign of Empress Lü, 
twenty one under Emperor Wen, thirty-four under Emperor Jing, and seventy 
under Emperor Wu. Since all of the seventy nobilities abolished during the reign of Emperor Wu, sixty-ive are recorded for the period between the beginning of his reign and the end of the Yuan feng period (110-105), and only ive further 
in the time from the beginning of the Taichu period until the end of his reign (104-87), the table data corroborate the historiographer’s remark, made in his preface to the table, that by the beginning of the Taichu period, only ive out of 
the more than one hundred nobilities were still preserved. 31As for what the historiographer calls “a whole forest of merits and deiciencies 
in our present age” 32 in his personal remarks, the table entries also provide the 
30. Shiji 18.878, 8-10: 居今之世，志古之䚃，所ԕ自鏡也，ᵚ必盡਼。帝王者各殊禮
而異務，要ԕ成࣏為統紀，豈可緄乎？觀所ԕ得尊寵及所ԕ廢辱，亦當世得失
之林也，何必舊聞？於是謹ަ終始，表ަ文，頗有所不盡ᵜᵛ˗著ަ明，疑者
闕之。ᖼ有君子，欲推而列之，得ԕ覽焉。Cf. Chavannes 1898: 125; cf. Watson 1961a: 427ff.
31. According to the table, the names of these ive nobilities were Yanghe, Dai, Quzhou, 
Pingyang and Guling. See also the Zhengyi commentary by Zhang Shoujie, Shiji 18.878: 7.
32. Dangshi de shi zhi lin 當世得失之林. See Shiji 15.878: 9.
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reader with the reasons why the meritorious men enfeoffed by Gaozu or their 
descendants had lost their domains.The reasons indicated in the table can be roughly classiied as falling into three categories: irstly, that the nobility holder had died without having a son or other successor to his family line; secondly, that the nobility holder in compensation for his nobility received another ief or title; and thirdly, that the 
holder of a nobility was deprived of his domain due to his being charged with 
some crime.Among these three categories, the second—the nobility holder received other ief or title—is the smallest (only four cases among the 141 closures); as regards the irst reason—the nobility holder died without a successor—there are also few cases (altogether twenty-six); very much in contrast, the third reason indicated in the table entries—nobility lost due to the nobility holder being charged with crime—prevails by far (111 cases). If one compares the numbers 
indicated for the reigns of Han rulers, it can be observed that the number of 
domains abolished during the reign of Emperor Wu due to the nobility holder 
being charged with a crime exceeds that of all previous Han rulers taken together, 
namely altogether sixty-four cases. 33
Of all 111 cases in which the nobility holder was charged with a crime, in 
thirty three cases the historiographer did not specify the reason for the charge. In seventy-eight cases, however, the reason is speciied. During the time of 
Emperor Wu, of the sixty-four domains that were closed due to their holders being charged with a crime, no crime is speciied for only eight of the sixty-
four cases where domains were closed due to their holders being charged with a crime, whereas in ifty-six cases they were speciied. And here as well, there is a signiicant difference between the time before and after the beginning of the era of Taichu: of all ifty-six cases in which a charge for a speciied crime was made, ifty-one can be dated before the beginning of the era of Taichu, i.e. before the year 104, and only ive in the time after; and in none of the eight cases in which an unspeciied charge was made was this later than 104.
The data shown in the table thus clearly translate what the histori o grapher must have meant by that “forest of merits and deiciencies.” It is a metaphor 
for a situation in which the standards of what was right and wrong must have 
become so complicated or even arbitrary that almost none of the descendants 
of those men who had once received these domains for their merits proved 
deserving enough to preserve them under Emperor Wu.
33. The number given for Gaozu is 2, for Huidi 1, for Lühou 4, for Wendi 13, and for Jingdi 27, in all 47.
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What is more, during the time from the beginning of Emperor Wu’s reign 
until the end of the Yuanfeng period, i.e. the years between 140 and 105, there is one year in which a conspicuously large number of iefs, namely seventeen out of altogether ifty-one closures, are recorded in the table as abolished, namely the year 112. Apart from two cases, all the others—in all ifteen persons—were 
charged with misbehavior in the context of the “Liquor Gold Statute.” This 
statute, which had probably been introduced by Han Emperor Wen, stipulated that the nobles—who were exempt from taxes—were requested to assist at the 
celebration of the annual ceremony of Imperial liquor. The amount of gold to be delivered was to be proportionate to the size of the nobles’domains. 34 Indeed 
in 112, an order was issued for an inspection of the gold that the nobles had 
presented to the throne. The result of this inspection was that in many cases 
the nobles had not presented adequate gold, either in quality or in quantity, as required by the size of their domains. Many nobles were thus deprived of their 
nobility in the very same year. 35
Viewed in the light of the Shiji author’s remarks, it seems that the many different reasons given for persons being deprived of their iefs during Emperor Wu’s reign, and especially those who lost their iefs on the basis of the Imperial 
liquor ceremony, exemplify what the historiographer laments in his preface. He 
also seems to suggest that all these apparently unprecedented reasons were, in 
34. The Liquor Gold Statute, zhoujin lü 酎金ᖻ, or, more precisely, the Statute “on the Gold (presented at the Sacriice of the Eighth Month) Fermented Liquor” was, according to Hulsewé (1955), 38, a statute that contained the rules concerning the compulsory contributions to be made by the nobility. As Dubs (1944), 126, explains, “nobles were 
exempt from taxes, but they were required to make an offering proportionate to the size of their estates in order to assist in defraying the expenses of the sacriices to the 
imperial ancestors at the time of the offering of the specially fermented liquor in the 
eighth calendar month. Failure to offer the required amount was punished by dismissal 
from noble rank or degradation.”
35. According to the table entries in Shiji 18, in the year 112 the following nobilities among those that had been established by the dynasty founder Gaozu were closed because 
their owners were charged with irregularities related to their duties in the context of the Imperial liquor ceremony: Jiang, Liangzou, Xinyang, Zhifang, Aling, Chiqiu, Pinggao, 
Gao, Qing, Eshi, Luliang, Kaifeng, Linyuan, De, Tao. The only two owners of nobilities 
charged with other crimes were those of Zhi (charged with immoral behavior) and 
Lecheng (charged with murder and executed in public). The even much higher number of all 106 nobles who were deprived of their nobilities in 112 given by Loewe (2004: 294) must be based on the table entries of Hanshu 16 which also includes the nobilities 
newly established for merit under the Emperor Hui, Empress Lü, and Emperor Wen.
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the irst place, merely a pretext for the emperor to abolish these iefs. 36 Very similarly, Michael Loewe interpreted the reason why Emperor Wu abolished so many of the iefs that the dynasty founder, Gaozu, once had created, saying,
It seems unlikely that this major change was due simply to the reasons that were alleged. Possibly the step was taken as a deliberate measure to eliminate the inluence 
of some of the well-established families of the day. Possibly it may be construed 
as punishment for failure to respond to a call for volunteers to join the campaigns against rebels from Nan Yue or from among the Qiang peoples. 37
It is certainly plausible to assume that Emperor Wu’s major interest was to eliminate the inluence of what Loewe calls “the well-established families of 
the day.” But perhaps one should even consider a possible connection between 
the steps taken by this emperor towards elimination of more and more of these regional powers and his own steady progression towards a more centralized 
and bureaucratic state. Against this political background, a detail indicated in one of the table columns mentioned above seems to deserve special attention: 
Different from the reign years of all the other emperors, the historiographer 
has divided the entries in the column relating to Emperor Wu, into two parts, the irst part comprising the irst 36 years (i.e. from the beginning of Jianyuan, 140, to the end of Yuanfeng, 105), and the second part comprising the latter 28 
years of his reign (i.e. from the First Year of Taichu, 104, to the Second Year of Houyuan, 87). 38 Thus it even seems that the historiographer intended to turn 
his reader’s attention to the fact that Emperor Wu abolished the largest numbers of iefs before the year 104.Since the very name of the era Taichu—“Grand Inception”—is closely 
linked with the installation of a grand new calendar, to be inaugurated soon after Emperor Wu had successfully conducted the Feng and Shan Sacriices on Mount 
Tai, it does not seem too farfetched, in my view, to assume that the closure of so many iefs in the time immediately preceding this decisive event was meant as an integral part of Emperor Wu’s overall striving for a more centralized rule 
ultimately emulating that of the Yellow Thearch (Huangdi). And, what is more, 
it seems that the historiographer intended to point out this political background 
36. For the suggestion that the suspiciously high rate of abolished iefs in the year 112, 
allegedly due to the nobles’negligence in responding to the statute, was probably merely 
a pretext for Emperor Wu to close the nobilities as a kind of revenge for the refusal 
of these nobles to support the emperor in his military expeditions, see also Emmerich 1991: 117.37. Loewe 2004: 294.38. Cf. Shiji 18.879: 1-6.
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to indicate to his reader the violent and sometimes arbitrary character of this 
emperor’s actions.
2.3. Assessing Emperor Wu’s “Performance” on Mount Tai
The historiographer’s allusion to Gongyang zhuan in chap. 28, the “Monograph on the Feng and Shan Sacriices,” is a peculiar case, since not 
only the historiographer’s personal remark in which the allusion is contained 
but almost the whole of the chapter content has a doublet in chap. 12, entitled 
“Basic Annals of (Emperor) Wu the Filial.” 39
The main content of this doublet is a description of the steps that Emperor 
Wu undertook, mainly upon the advice of certain specialists, for performing the sacriices on Mount Tai as well as a record of the result of these sacriices. 
Here is what the Shiji author says in his personal remark which is also part of the doublet and thus found at the end of both chapters:
I accompanied the emperor when he journeyed about to sacriice to Heaven and 
Earth, the other deities, and the famous mountains and rivers, and when he went 
to perform the Feng and Shan. (I) entered the Temple of Long Life and assisted at the sacriices when the deity spoke, and (I) thus had an opportunity to study and 
examine the intention 40 of the men of techniques and the sacriicial oficials. After 
that (I) retired in order to discuss successively how from ancient times services were 
rendered to the spirits and ghosts, setting forth in doing so both the outside and the 
inside of these (matters). If there will be superior men in future generations, they may make use of this material for their examination. As for the details of sacriicial plates 
and utensils, the types of jades and silks offered, or the exact ritual to be followed in presenting them—these may be left to the oficials who handle such matters. 41
But what did the Shiji author mean by mentioning the “outside” and the “inside” 
of affairs that he intended to set forth in this chapter? It is important to know that 
39. Apart from a small introductory section in chap. 12 that offers some biographical data on Han Emperor Wu, the text in chap. 28 (“Feng Shan shu” 封禪書) is an almost 100 percent doublet of chap. 12 (“Xiao Wu benji” 孝武ᵜ紀). It has been argued by some 
that the doublet in chap. 12 was added to the Shiji by a later hand, but as I have tried 
to show in a previous study, there is good reason to treat both chapters as a “double 
record” intentionally made by the Shiji author. See Schaab-Hanke 2002b.
40. Where Shiji 28.1404, 4. has yi 意, rendered as “intention,” the doublet in Shiji 12.486, 
4 has yan 言, “words” instead.
41. Shiji 28.1404, 4-6: ཚ史ޜ曰˖余從巡祭ཙ地諸神਽山川而封禪焉。入壽宮侍祠神
語，究觀方士祠官之意，於是退而論次自古ԕ來用һ於鬼神者，ާ見ަ表㻿。
ᖼ有君子，得ԕ覽焉。至若俎豆珪幣之詳，獻酬之禮，則有司ᆈ焉。Cf. Shiji 12.486: 4-6. See Watson 1961b: 51f.
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the text begins with a discussion about rulers who from antiquity on either did not proceed to conduct the holy sacriices on Mount Tai although they would have been worthy to do so, or they proceeded to carry out the sacriices but 
were not successful either due to lack of virtue or of merit. From these words it becomes apparent that any ruler who planned to conduct these sacriices took a 
certain risk, namely that of possibly not being the right candidate to do so and 
that of being evaluated accordingly by specialists who knew all the details of the sacriices.
What follows in the text is a historical survey of rulers who either proceeded with the sacriices or, for whatever reasons, did not do so. Of these, there are two 
rulers to whom most space is devoted in the account, namely the First Emperor 
of Qin and Emperor Wu of the Han. 42
As for the First Emperor of Qin, it has been pointed out by many that his proceeding to Mount Tai, which is decribed in Shiji chap. 6 as having been 
motivated primarily by his desire to obtain immortality, was certainly not 
successful. This is what the record tells us when it says that on his way down from Mount Tai he encountered heavy rain and had to rest under a tree. 43As for Emperor Wu then, the direct comparison shows that—at least at irst sight—this emperor, in contrast to Qin Shi Huang was seemingly successful. It is even emphasized in the record that there was no rain or thunder when he was on his way to the top of the mountain. He performed the sacriices and “it 
seemed” that there were even positive reactions on the part of Heaven.
The question of biao li, or the difference between the outward and the inward 
behavior is raised precisely in the context of the account of how the emperor was persuaded to take the preparatory measures necessary to conduct the sacriices on Mount Tai. Very similar to the way the Shiji author informs his readers how the Qin Emperor had been persuaded to put the sacriices into practice, we learn 
how Gongsun Qing, a “man of techniques” (fangshi) who was said to have 
discovered a tripod in Fenyin also claimed to have received an oral prophecy 
and who told Emperor Wu about the prospect of obtaining immortality after having made a successful sacriice on top of Mount Tai. Upon this, Emperor Wu 
is reported by the Shiji author to have exclaimed enthusiastically:
42. While the critical character of the text contained in Shiji 28 (and in Shiji 12) was wholly neglected in the study conducted by Mark Edward Lewis, Hans van Ess emphasizes that chap. 28 was written by Sima Qian with the intention of criticizing Emperor Wu, but 
he takes the textual parallel in chap. 12 as a later addition by someone else. See Lewis 1999: 50-80; van Ess 2002a; and also 2002b; the latter study is mainly focused on the 
relationship between Shiji 28 and Hanshu 25A.
43. Shiji 6.242: 9; cf. Watson 1993: 46.
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Alas, indeed, if I could only become like the Yellow Thearch, I would regard quitting 
my wife and children as being no more than casting off one’s slippers! 44
On the one hand this passage clearly illustrates how some of these “men of 
techniques” such as Gongsun Qing enticed the emperor with the prospect of immortality and thereby managed to manipulate him; and on the other hand the 
historiographer, through his report of these stories, debunks his own emperor 
for so easily being manipulated by Gongsun Qing and others like him. 45
In this context, two more key terms used in the historiographer’s personal 
remark deserve our attention, namely yi, “intentions,” in contrast to yan, 
“words.” While yi is found in chap. 28, it is replaced by yan in chap. 12. 46 It thus seems as if the annals rnote the oficial record, whereas in chap. 28 stress 
is laid upon the critical examination of the circumstance and, above all, of the 
underlying intent. By pointing out the intentions (yi) beneath Gongsun Qing’s 
words (yan), the historiographer again indicates Emperor Wu’s egocentrism 
and greed. On the other hand, it is perhaps not too farfetched to consider the fact that more than ninety percent of the annals of Emperor Wu are illed with the account of these sacriices. This should be regarded as quite a distorted and 
exaggerated treatment of an event, which was certainly important but hardly the 
only important matter that was worth recording for the long reign of Emperor Wu. Moreover, the inclusion of this event in the annals might even be interpreted 
as a monument to Wudi’s ultimate failure.In summary, both chap. 28 and its near doublet, chap. 12, appear to be criticism 
directed at Emperor Wu. They reproach him for arrogance and disrespect in his 
attitude towards the deities and ghosts, and with having proceeded too quickly and too violently to the performance of the sacriices, with a primary personal 
interest in achieving immortality, very much like the “bad model” of the First 
Emperor of Qin before him. Thus it seems that, in spite of what was formally 
being recorded as a “success,” at closer examination of the underlying intentions, 
by using the techniques of comparing the “outside” with the “inside” (biao li), in the historiographer’s mind Emperor Wu inally turns out not to be the long 
awaited sage of the Han.
44. Shiji 28.1394; Shiji 12.468: 嗟乎！吾誠得如黃帝，吾視去妻子如脫缢耳。See Schaab-Hanke 2002b: 167; 2002a: 305.
45. For an earlier study where I have examined more in detail how Emperor Wu was 
successively persuaded by what I have called “cosmologists” to proceed to the Feng and Shan Sacriices, see Schaab-Hanke 2002a.46. Cf. Shiji 28.1404: 4 (yi) versus Shiji 12.486: 4 (yan), see the translation above.
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2.4. Storing the work away and devoting it to sages of later ages
Last but not least, let us take a closer look at the passage contained in 
chap. 130 of the Shiji, the autobiographical one. 47 As emphasized in the 
beginning of this essay, the wording of this last passage comes closest to its 
prototype in the Gongyang zhuan. 48 Remarkably, the passage is not only part 
of the “His Lord the Grand Scribe says” section but it is also placed at the end 
of the rhymed preface related to chap. 130. Here is the passage in the context of the sentences preceding it:
[This work, which] comprises 130 chapters and consists of 526,500 characters, is 
the book of His Lord the Grand Scribe. It was compiled in order to repair omissions 
and amplify the Six Disciplines. It completes the work of one school tradition, by 
supplementing the various interpretations of the Six Classics and putting into order 
the miscellaneous sayings of the Hundred Schools. (I) have placed one copy in the Famous Mountain 49 and another in the capital, so that it may await the sages and 
superior men of a future generation. 50
Several aspects of this passage deserve more attention. Apart from being so 
parallel in its wording to the Gongyang zhuan, it is also conspicuously parallel 
with regard to its placement in the work. As mentioned above, the passage in the 
Gongyang zhuan is placed close to the end of the work, and it refers to Confucius 
who, after the unicorn had been caught, knowing that during his lifetimes no 
sage ruler was still expected to come, “applied the moral rules of the Spring 
and Autumn (Annals) to wait for sages of later (generations).”
Similarly, the Shiji passage is placed almost at the end of the Shiji, followed 
only by one more sentence in which an arc is again traced from the time of the 
Yellow Thearch (Huangdi) down to the era of Taichu, pointing towards the 
exact number of chapters, namely altogether 130, which this work comprises. 51 
47. Shiji 130.3285-3321 (“Taishigong zixu” ཚ史ޜ自序).48. In his Suoyin commentary, Sima Zhen explicitly points out that it is the Gongyang zhuan 
to which the historiographer alludes here. See Shiji 130.3321: 9.49. The “famous mountain” (mingshan ਽山) is, according to the explanation given by Sima 
Zhen, an archive (shufu 書府). See Shiji 130.3321: 6. According to Wang Liqi, this term meant the oficial court library, as contrasted to the house of the scribe’s family in the 
capital. See Shiji zhuyi, 2791. In the opinion of others, e.g., Zhang Dake, the term might 
also point toward a private library, such as the scribe’s archive. See his Shiji xinzhu, 2175.
50. Shiji 130.3319: 14-3320, 1: 凡百三十篇，五十Ҽ萬ޝ千五百ᆇ，為ཚ史ޜ書。序
略，ԕ拾遺補蓺，成一家之言，厥協ޝ經異傳，整齊百家雜語，㯿之਽山，副
在京師，؏ᖼ世聖人君子。第七十。Cf. Watson 1958: 92.
51. Shiji 130.3321: 11.
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It thus seems that the implication underlying the allusion to the Gongyang zhuan 
intended by the historiographer is on the one hand that his work, the Shiji, should 
somehow be compared or even equated with the Chunqiu, and, what is more, the 
historiographer himself in consequence seems to take on the role of Confucius. 52
This is all the more interesting, since in the sentences preceding the passage 
quoted above, the historiographer diligently enumerates the numbers of the 
chapters belonging to each category in the Shiji, beginning with the twelve 
chapters of the section “Annals” (benji), and ending with the seventy chapters 
subsumed under the category “Biographies” (liezhuan). It almost seems that by 
enumerating the chapters in this fashion the historiographer wants to safeguard 
against later additions to, or obliterations from his original work without their 
being easily detected. 53 As Jan Assmann has observed, the desire to ix the exact 
wording of a book for a future generation is typical of cultures which have lost 
part of their rituals and identity and for whom the compilation of canons thus 
becomes an essential element to preserve cultural memory. This is what Assmann 
has called the “canon formula.” 54
Last but not least, by pointing out that two copies of the work have been inalized, one to be placed in the “Famous Mountain” (mingshan) and another in the capital—which probably means that one copy should be deposited in the scribe’s archive and the other in the house of the Sima clan in Chang’an—the 
historiographer probably intended to safeguard at least one copy of his work to 
be preserved for future worthy readers who would draw their conclusions from it. Again it is not farfetched to assume that all this relects a critical assessment 
of his present ruler, Emperor Wu.
2.5. Facets of the historiographer’s criticism—a brief synopsis
It has been argued at the beginning of this essay that each of the ive passages 
of the Shiji text in which the historiographer alludes to the Gongyang zhuan 
adds one facet to an overall critical assessment of Emperor Wu. 55 It is now time 
52. For a previous essay on Sima Qian as the “second Confucius,” see Durrant 1995: 1-28.
53. What the Shiji author is a clear reminder of what we learn in Shiji 85 about the Lüshi 
chunqiu, with its eight lan, six lun, and twelve ji, in all more than 200,000 characters and which its compilator Lü Buwei exhibited at the market gates of Xianyang, announcing 
that if anyone were able to either add or remove one character of this text he would give 
him a thousand pieces of gold. See Shiji 85.251: 7-9.
54. See Assmann 1992: 105, where he deines a canon as “die Fortsetzung ritueller Kohärenz im Medium schriftlicher Überlieferung” (extension of ritual coherence by the medium 
of written transmission).
55. This is, of course, not to deny that there are many other passages in the Shiji that can 
likewise be adduced to point to the historiographer’s overall critical attitude. However, 
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to reconsider the facets that we have been able to trace so far and to draw some 
preliminary conclusions from the previous analysis.
To begin with chap. 15, although there is no explicit criticism in the 
historiographer’s introductory words, there is little doubt that by pointing at 
Qin, as elsewhere in the Shiji, he implicitly scolded Han. His remarks about the “irst signs of prosperity and decay” in his introduction, and even more the “irst signs of transgression” he perceives in the early development of the state of Qin on its way to power under a uniied rule may certainly also be applied 
to Emperor Wu and his rule.The main lesson to be drawn from Chap. 18 seems to be how violently Emperor Wu abolished almost the half of all iefs that had been installed either under Gaozu or one of his successors. As has been suggested above, these 
measures should probably be viewed against the background of Emperor Wu’s intended performance of the sacred Feng and Shan Sacriices on Mount Tai and 
the installation of the new calendar. It has been suggested that Emperor Wu thus 
intended to emulate the Yellow Thearch (Huangdi). But of course, less remote 
though at the same time less successful, the First Emperor, too, is certainly taken 
here as a model, and this decisive step taken by Emperor Wu, if compared with the time when Liu Bang irst established the Han dynasty, reminds one strongly 
of the passage in Shiji 6, the “Annals of the First August Emperor,” where in 
a dialogue with the Qin Emperor his chancellor Li Si vehemently advises him not to bestow any hereditary iefs upon oficials. 56As for the near doublet contained in chap. 28 and 12 of the Shiji, the historical 
parallel drawn by the historiographer is even more obvious. While the First Emperor’s proceeding to Taishan is described in chap. 6 unmistakably as unsuccessful, at irst sight Emperor Wu’s attempt seems to have been on the 
whole successful. 57 However, as we have seen above, the historiographer’s subtle rhetoric suggests to an attentive reader that in the context of these sacriices there 
was so much wrong or even “fake” that the record at closer reading appears to portray the sacriices on Mount Tai as unsuccessful. Again, it is the historical example of Qin and its First Emperor which the historiographer uses to criticize 
Emperor Wu.
the hypothesis proposed here is that the Shiji author intentionally places his allusion to the 
Gongyang zhuan precisely in these ive passages to alert his reader to be more attentive 
to some information given in the related chapters than he might otherwise have been.56. See Shiji 6.238: 17-239: 5 (“Qin Shi Huang benji” 秦始皇ᵜ紀).57. Michael Puett has argued that, in the historiographer’s mind, only the irst step of Emperor Wu’s grand project, his sacriicing on Mount Tai, was successful, while the next 
step, namely that of obtaining immortality, was not. See Puett (2001), esp. p. 202-204.
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Last but not least, the historiographer’s reference in chap. 130 to sages and 
superior men of later generations to whom the work is devoted, in combination 
with the remark that two copies of the work will be made, one of them to be hidden in the “Famous Mountain,” should probably not be interpreted as speciic criticism of his emperor. Rather, this inal remark seems to be the consequence 
of all the facets pointed out in the other passages, namely that the lesson to be 
drawn from all this is not meant to be a pedagogical lesson for a living monarch 
but rather for one who was not born yet, or for the supporter of such a potential 
sage ruler in a future age.In summary, the various facets of the historiographer’s criticism identiied in 
the passages discussed above all seem to refer to the preparatory steps Emperor Wu took while he was preparing to conduct the sacriices on Mount Tai. In fact, 
some of these measures, as e.g. his decision to gradually curb the inluence of the 
nobilities, remind one to some degree of those already taken by his predecessors, beginning with Liu Bang, later Gaozu, who amended his initial project to honor all his loyal followers with a iefdom or even a kingdom, by proclaiming that 
henceforth only members of his own clan, Liu, should be made kings. 58 But 
whereas Liu Bang’s later policy seems to have been a small corrective to his 
general turn towards a feudal system, in contrast to Qin Shi Huang’s wholesale replacement of the earlier ief system in favor of a new centralized system, 
Emperor Wu, roughly one hundred years after the founding of the Han, almost 
seems to be following Qin Shi Huang in bringing about a paradigmatic shift of the government system, abolishing most of the iefs created by the dynasty founder and replacing them by an increasing number of oficials serving in 
a hierarchically structured central government. Viewed in this context, the abolition of iefs and especially so shortly before the emperor’s planned “Grand 
Inception” could well be interpreted as part of Emperor Wu’s new politico-
ideological agenda in which both the Yellow Thearch (Huangdi), as the ideal 
ruler of remote antiquity, and the First Emperor, who was less remote in time 
albeit more an “anti-hero,” both played an important part. 59 Thus, by recording 
58. For the idea that an important aspect for Emperor Wu in abolishing the iefs might have been a lesson drawn from the rebellion of the seven kings in 202, see Emmerich 1991: 116f; also see van Ess (forthcoming).59. The role of Huangdi as the remote sage whom Emperor Wu seems to have emulated in his efforts to establish his new bureaucratic system has also been emphasized by Michael Puett 2001: 175. He writes that Emperor Wu was claiming that “the norm for succeeding dynasties to follow would not be enfeoffment but imperial centralization, and the organizing sage that such successors would try to emulate would be, Wudi hoped, 
himself. Empire was thus presented as the new norm, completely in accord with the 
divine and natural worlds.”
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how many of the iefs established under the dynasty founder had been abolished 
during the reign of Emperor Wu, the historiographer indirectly points to that 
decisive step taken by his contemporary ruler.
But whatever the historiographer’s general ideological stance towards Emperor Wu’s endeavors to achieve a more centralized state system may have 
been, an important detail concerning the various objects of his criticism that has 
been mentioned repeatedly is that it was not so much directed against Emperor 
Wu’s actions per se but rather against the way he went about achieving these 
things. For example, as we saw above, in his account of the dialogue between 
Gongsun Qing and Emperor Wu the Shiji author emphasizes that the magician inally managed to persuade Emperor Wu to conduct the Feng and Shan Sacriices 
with the prospect that by doing so the emperor would gain immortality. By subtly depicting both the underlying intention of the latterer Gongsun Qing and that of 
the egocentric and greedy emperor the historiographer uses rhetoric reminiscent 
of a modern psychologist.
Even more subtle is the historiographer’s critical assessment in the above-mentioned doublet in chap. 28 and 12. His remark that he “had opportunity to 
study and examine the intention of the “men of techniques (fangshi) and the sacriicial oficials (ciguan), the fact that the word for “intentions” (yi) was 
replaced by that for “words” (yan), in the doublet in chap. 12 suggests that the 
historiographer intends to reveal to an attentive reader a contradiction between 
what these men had said (to the emperor, namely that Heaven had re act ed positively and Wudi’s performance on Mount Tai was thus successful) and their true intention (to latter the emperor in order to avoid his irritation and to bring beneit primarily for themselves). Of course, by thus analyzing the true 
motivations behind the deeds of these specialists, the historiographer indirectly also criticized his emperor once again for being so easily misled, thus striking 
at his vanity and greed.
In all the above mentioned cases it seems that the historiographer gives 
more weight to attitude or intention than to the deed itself. To give priority to 
intention rather than to the deed, however, is precisely one of the basic tenets 
of the Gongyang school. 60 Perhaps the most prominent example of a historical igure condemned by the author or compiler of the Gongyang zhuan for a murder 
he clearly did not commit is Zhao Dun, a high minister of Duke Ling of Jin. 
According to the Gongyang zhuan, Zhao was morally responsible for the murder 
60. This is similar with what Jurij Kroll (1976) observed in his study on the impact of the 
Gongyang zhuan on the Shiji as a literary work and what he calls the Gongyang zhuan’s 
“Concept of Will.”
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because he had not only tried to lee from his state after his ruler was killed, but 
did not even punish the killer after he had returned to his state. 61
3. The temporal cesura that turns criticism into “treason”
So far, this study has been conined to analyzing the various facets of the 
historiographer’s critical assessment of Emperor Wu. But should the criticism 
passed by the historiographer here simply be understood as a warning, in the 
hope that the emperor might still change his attitude, or is it rather a judgment passed after a process of evaluation, with the result that a ruler inally turned out 
to not to be the sage awaited for so long?  62 It will be argued here that what the 
historiographer does by addressing later sages and superior men, is the latter, namely the historiographer’s inal judgment that the emperor was ultimately 
no sage ruler.
Let us turn once again to our protoype in the Gongyang zhuan. In abstract 
terms, the appearance of the unicorn in the West in the 14th year of Duke Ai 
of Lu was for Confucius the signal for a temporal cesura. It seems that until 
this point in time he was still hoping that a sage ruler would appear during his 
lifetime. But after he was told that a unicorn had been caught somewhere to the 
West (of his birthplace Lu), the situation completely changed. The difference 
was that, for whatever reasons, the master was now certain his fate was that 
no sage ruler would appear during his lifetime. Therefore he concluded that he 
should dedicate his great project, a historical record in which he preserved all 
the right behavior required for the rule of a sage, to superior men of a later age.
Similarly, when the historiographer addresses superior men of later ages, 
he turns what might be regarded as a simple warning to a ruler for pedagogical 
purposes into a piece of severe criticism. For this passage informs others that the ruler governing during the time the historiographer was writing in the inal 
analysis turned out to be no sage ruler.
Thus it is precisely the temporal cesura implied here in the Gongyang zhuan 
which, in its combination with the various facets of the historiographer’s critical 
assessment of his own emperor, turns the rhetorical tool of allusion used by the 
61. See Gongyang zhuan, Xuan 6.1; also referred to in Shiji 43.1782: 12; cf. Schaab-Hanke 2010a: 117f.62. There has been much debate among Shiji specialists as to whether the historiographer’s criticism of Emperor Wu should be understood as a warning or rather as a inal judgment. 
See, e.g., Hans van Ess (forthcoming), who argues that Sima Qian’s description of Qin Shi Huang’s unsuccessful attempt to proceed to Mount Tai was meant merely a warning 
addressed to Emperor Wu since, in his view, “nothing was obviously proven yet in Emperor Wu’s case at the time when Sima Qian was inishing his Shiji..”
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historiographer into a type of dangerous political dynamite. Small wonder that 
by using such “treasonous” rhetoric, the Shiji author all too easily incurred the 
risk of being charged with lèse-majesté.
As for the precise point in time which marks the watershed between a still 
cher ished hope and a hope lost, several remarks in the Shiji text suggest that it was not the year in which the sacriices on Mount Tai took place, namely 110, 
but rather the year in which the era of Taichu began, namely 104, which had 
been envisaged by those specialists who were entrusted with calculating the 
date when the new cycle in the succes sion of the Yellow Thearch would begin. 
Since this year was probably also the deci sive year in which Emperor Wu, on 
the basis of these calculations, should have ob tained immortality, it was not so dificult for the specialists to deter mine that at least this second part of the experiment was deinitely not successful. 63
4. Inconsistencies in the author’s attitude towards Emperor Wu
If one tries to created a picture of how in his account the historiographer 
assessed Han Wudi, the impression that especially in this regard the 
historiographer’s mirror is, as Durrant has put it in his famous work, “a quite distorted and cloudy one,” is indeed quite itting. 64 The more one reads this 
comprehensive work the less one knows for certain whether Emperor Wu is perceived there as the expected sage ruler who has only to be inally approved by Heaven, or whether he is not; the picture is inconsistent; it even seems 
contradictory at times.
The mirror, however, might become less cloudy if one takes into consideration 
that we might have to reckon with at least two “mirrors” instead of one. As I have argued elsewhere, there is good reason to assume that there are two signiicantly 
different attitudes that can be traced in the Shiji text. 65 One may be described 
as quite positive, one that is open-minded to what will happen but at the same time seems to expect that the time when grand events will take place is close; 
63. Seen in this light, the doublet in chap. 12 which the Shiji author, as I have argued 
elsewhere, probably placed there intentionally, seems to show that Emperor Wu in the 
end turned out to be not the sage ruler of the Han that many had expected him to be. 
Perhaps Emperor Wu’s failure to obtain immortality was so central to the historiographer 
that all other events down to the end of his reign may have seemed to him not to be of 
any more importance.64. See Durrant 1995: esp. his epilogue, 147. More precisely, Steve Durrant speaks of “Sima 
Qian’s mirror.”65. For an earlier attempt at telling Tan from Qian on the basis of different exegetical attitudes, see Schaab-Hanke 2010a: 127-129.
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one might even characterize this attitude as imbued by an eschatological hope. The other attitude is less positive; it is generally skeptical, at times even cynical, 
and records things in a much more distant and sober way.
These two attitudes are, as has been argued above, quite irreconcilable. 
In fact, it almost seems that the historiographer, with quite a different end in 
mind, is struggling with a story begun by someone else. While he would like to 
continue the story, he can only do so by reaching a quite different conclusion 
than the earlier writer intended.
5. Some inal suggestions regarding the “traitor’s” identity
So far, the question of authorship has been avoided in this essay. However, in 
this last section it will be argued that in the rhetoric of allusion contained in the ive passages examined here one can clearly distinguish the voice of one of the 
two Sima. Those who are accustomed to presuming that Sima Qian was the main 
author of the Shiji may not ind such an assignment noteworthy. However, those 
who consider the possibility of a dual authorship of the Shiji text may perhaps be 
interested to apply the implications of the rhetoric of allusion discussed above 
to the question of how to tell Sima Tan’s voice from that of his son Sima Qian.
In what follows it will be argued that the attitude that has been described 
above as quite positive or even imbued by an eschatological hope is characteristic 
of Sima Tan, while the less positive, generally skeptical, at times even cynical attitude is the one that characterizes Sima Qian. Since I have discussed elsewhere 
in some detail the eschatological trait in the overall ideological frame of the 
Shiji, 66 I will conine myself to adduce only some examples here which show 
that the person to whom this attitude may safely be ascribed is Sima Tan.In chap. 130, the autobiographical and inal chapter of the Shiji, there are 
several passages which may be adduced as examples for the eschatological 
attitude which can be clearly assigned to Sima Tan. For example, in the famous 
deathbed scene in which Sima Qian refers to words that he had heard from his 
father, Sima Tan. Sima Tan laments bitterly over the fact that now, in the very year that Emperor Wu would proceed to the sacriices on Mount Tai, he would 
not be able to be in the emperor’s entourage. All the more emphatically, he urges his son Qian to continue and inalize what he had intended to write, saying:
66. For more details on the overall ideological frame of the Shiji as a basis trait that may be 
ascribed to Sima Tan as well as for more on the professional share of the probably three Sima in making preparations for Emperor Wu’s grand reforms, see Schaab-Hanke 2002b: 327-334, “The third of them—Sima Xiangru’s impact on Emperor Wu’s reforms.”
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Now the House of Han has arisen and all the world is united under one rule. I have 
been a Grand Scribe and yet I have failed to set forth a record of the enlightened 
ruler(s), the worthy nobles, the faithful ministers and the gentlemen who were ready 
to die for duty. I am fearful that the historical materials will be neglected and lost. 
You must remember and think of this! 67
Slightly earlier in the text, Sima Qian reports his father pondering over the “more 
than four hundred years that have elapsed since the capture of the unicorn,” 
which again suggests that his father was eagerly waiting for the result of the sacriices that he and his son were preparing for the emperor.
In contrast to his father, Sima Qian witnessed the time after Emperor Wu conducted the sacred sacriices on Mount Tai. He also lived long enough to see 
that his emperor had neither become a sage nor, as the emperor wished, gained immortality. As a result, Sima Qian held a skeptical attitude—perhaps after a 
time even a cynical one.There is good reason to assume that all ive passages under examination here 
for their allusion to the Gongyang zhuan have been authored by Sima Qian. 
That is, he is the one who made use of the rhetorical tool of allusion to make this inal critical assessment of his emperor.The irst reason is that, very simply, only Sima Qian but not his father Tan 
lived long enough to experience the time after Emperor Wu had conducted the sacriices on Mount Tai. For this reason, both the record of these sacriices as 
well as the historiographer’s personal remarks which are, as we saw, contained both in chap. 28 and its doublet in chap. 12, were necessarily written by him. The 
same simple argument concerns the allusion contained at the end of chap. 130, 
which apart from Sima Tan’s words (which are again transmitted to us only 
thanks to his son’s record) must have been written by Sima Qian.Secondly, but closely related to the irst argument, is that precisely because he was the one to experience the time after Emperor Wu’s performance on Mount 
Tai, it was Sima Qian who was faced with the problem to insert the results of 
what might be called “Emperor Wu’s risky experiment somewhere in his father’s 
and his “joint” venture, the Shiji.My third and last argument in favor of Sima Qian as being the author of our ive passages is that there is good reason to assume that he was more familiar 
with the teachings of the Gongyang school than his father Tan, 68 especially in 
67. Shiji 130.3295, 12f: 今漢㠸，海內一統，明主賢君忠臣死義之士，余為ཚ史而弗
論載，廢ཙ下之史文，余甚懼焉，汝ަ念哉！Cf. Watson 1958: 49.68. See, for example, the early identiication of “Dong sheng” 董生 with Dong Zhongshu 
董仲舒 made by Zhang Shoujie in his Zhengyi commentary, Shiji 1.47.
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the form it was interpreted by the Han scholar Dong Zhongshu (195-115), who had been given an oficial teaching chair during the reign of Emperor Wu.
Probably the most spectacular passage in the Shiji in which this close 
familiarity of Sima Qian with the teachings of Dong Zhongshu becomes apparent 
is the famous conversation with his colleague, the calendar specialist Hu Sui, 
where Sima Qian explicitly refers to words that he had heard from the mouth of a certain “Master Dong,” who can safely be identiied with Dong Zhongshu. 69
To the suggestive question raised by Hu Sui, why in Sima Qian’s view 
Confucius decided to “compile the ‘Spring and Autumn’ (Annals),” Sima Qian responds:
I have heard Master Dong say, “When Confucius was Chief Minister of Justice in Lu, 
the ways of the Zhou had declined and fallen into disuse. The feudal lords abused him and the high oficials obstructed his plans. Confucius realized that his words were 
not being heeded, nor his doctrines put into practice. So he made a critical judgment 
of the rights and wrongs of a period of two hundred and forty-two years in order to provide a template of ritually correct behavior for All Under Heaven. He criticized the Son of Heaven, reprimanded the feudal lords, and condemned the high oficials 
in order to make known the business of a true ruler and that was all.” 70
Since I have examined the relationship of this passage with the text contained 
in one chapter of the Chunqiu fanlu, “Luxuriant Dew of the Spring and Autumn 
(Annals),” a text whose authorship has been ascribed to the Han scholar Dong 
Zhongshu, in more detail elsewhere, 71 let me only briely highlight the main parallels and their context here: That chapter begins with the question about why 
Confucius compiled the Spring and Autumn Annals. The response is that, on 
the one hand, it was in order to make a correct record of the Heavenly portenta, 
of the positions of kings and dukes and of the wishes of the people, and on the other hand, in order to illuminate what brings beneit and what brings loss, in 
order to help those who have the talent to be worthies to prosper and to wait 
69. As for Sima Tan, he certainly knew and may also at times have made use of the Gongyang 
zhuan, as well as the Guliang zhuan as the third of the three main texts transmitting 
the ideas laid down in the Chunqiu text, but, as I have argued elsewhere in more detail, Sima Tan was in the irst place a cosmologist, and in the second place an exegete who 
apparently gave preference to the Zuozhuan with its abundant material to make a good historical narrative with political ends. See Schaab-Hanke 2010a: 127-129 (“Sima Tan and Sima Qian—Two Distinct Exegetes?”).70. Shiji 130. 3297, 8f: 余聞董生曰˖Ǎ周䚃衰廢，孔子為魯司寇，諸侯害之，大ཛ壅
之。孔子知言之不用，䚃之不行也，是非Ҽ百四十Ҽ年之中，ԕ為ཙ下儀表，貶
ཙ子，退諸侯，討大ཛ，ԕ䚄王һ而已矣。ǎCf. Watson 1958: 50f.71. See Schaab-Hanke 2010a: 122-126.
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for the sages of later (generations). And inally, that he based his relections on 
past events and added to them “the heart of a (true) king.” 72
The comparison of that Shiji passage with the above summarized passages 
from the chapter in the Chunqiu fanlu suggests that several important ideas which 
Sima Qian elucidates in his dialogue with Hu Sui are taken from the Gongyang 
zhuan, or at least, from teachings of Dong Zhongshu who for his part interpreted 
the Gongyang school and applied it on his own times. Firstly, the idea that the 
reason for Confucius to com pile the Chunqiu was indeed that the world was in 
disorder and decay and that Con fu cius thereby conceived the work as a “template 
of ritually correct behavior for All Under Heaven” (tianxia yibiao), to provide 
a sage ruler who was expected to come sometime in the future. Secondly, the 
idea that the corrections made by Confucius even included the Son of Heaven, 
in other words, the one who would make a work which stands in the tradition 
of the Chunqiu would not only be allowed but even have the duty to criticize 
even one’s ruler. And thirdly, even though there is no parallel to the phrase “to 
add to (the past events) the heart of a (true) king” in the Shiji text, the author 
of the Chunqiu fanlu text in this passage quite clearly challenges his reader to 
examine critically the intention underlying a ruler’s deeds. 73From all this we may draw two important conclusions. The irst is that Sima 
Qian, who was familiar with the teachings of Dong Zhongshu, may safely be identiied as the one who made use of the rhetoric of allusion analysed in 
this essay. The second conclusion is that the request to record not only the 
deed itself but also the underlying intent and that the critical examination of 
this attitude should include even the Son of Heaven is, if not as old as the 
Gongyang zhuan itself, at least as old as the teachings of Dong Zhongshu 
interpreting the Gongyang zhuan. Such a request, however, almost inevitably 
provokes a dilemma, namely precisely the dilemma that becomes evident in the 
dialogue between Sima Qian and Hu Sui and in which the latter takes the role 
of an advocatus diaboli who diagnoses the fact that making a historical record 
following after Confucius is, at the same time, an indirect act of hitting at one’s 
emperor. This dilemma is what Sima Qian must have been keenly aware of when 
he proceeded to record the events following his father’s death, i.e. following 
72. Chunqiu fanlu, “Yuxu” ؎序, 6.4/24/17-18: 孔子曰˖Ǎ吾因ަ行һ，而࣐乎王心
焉，ԕ為見之空言，不如行һ博深切明。ǎCf. the translation by Gentz 2001: 501ff. 
It should be added that the authenticity of this chapter has been called into question by 
some, but the fact that the Shiji author quotes them as words he had heard from Dong 
Zhongshu might even be taken as an argument in favor of its authenticity.73. There had been much debate on how this dificult passage of the Chunqiu fanlu should 
be ren dered. See, e.g., the proposals by Li 1994: 354, and the discussion in Gentz 2001: 504, n. 18.
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Emperor Wu’s sacriices on Mount Tai. But as the new “Grand Scribe” and with his father’s last words in mind he had no choice but to inish what his father had 
begun. Thus, rather than blaming him as the “traitor” among the two Sima, we should praise him for fulilling his duties as an excellent scribe who recorded 
nothing but the “truth.” 74
74. One further important point will, however, be added here, regarding the possibly 
farreaching political implication of that allusion to the Gongyang zhuan which we by 
now have been able safely to credit to Sima Qian rather than his father Tan. As has been 
mentioned in the beginning of this essay, in the context of our Gongyang zhuan passages 
to which Sima Qian alluded the author of the Gongyang zhuan is relecting about the 
possible reasons why Confucius compiled the “Spring and Autumn” Annals, and he asks if “the Master himself took his delight in the way in which Yao recognized Shun.” The 
idea that precisely the theory of voluntary abdication of one ruler in favor of another 
mentioned here may have been a further central aspect of Dong Zhongshu’s teachings has been suggested by Gary Arbuckle. In his essay, he asks if Dong Zhongshu—very 
much different from the picture that common wisdom generally sketches of him as a 
kind of master ideologue supporting Emperor Wu in his ambitious plans to become a god-emperor himself—did in reality “perhaps look beyond the contemporary occupants 
of the throne to those who were destined to succeed them, believing he could predict the 
course of future history by the employment of some historical scheme?” See Arbuckle 1995: 586. Without providing a response to this he then turns to a Gongyang disciple 
in the second generation, Sui Hong, who “did indeed believe that the Han mandate had been terminated, a belief that led him to demand that Emperor Zhao (r. 87-74) abdicate 
in obedience to Heaven.” As for Sima Qian, there is, in my view, no evidence for any 
concrete ideas on his part that would suggest that Emperor Wu, too, should abdicate in 
favour of another ruler. However, it is important to note that when the later Zhaodi was 
still a child and Huo Guang who had been appointed by Emperor Wu to the position of a regent there was, as Arbuckle: 587, has also mentioned, “a good deal of evidence that 
a pedigree was being forged for him that ‘proved’ his descent from the Yellow Lord, and which would have justiied his claiming the imperial throne as successor to the 
Han.” It is precisely this pedigree which has been added later by someone, probably 
Chu Shaosun, to chap. 20 of the Shiji. As I have argued in a previous study, Chu might 
have intended to alert the reader that Sima Qian’s son in law, Yang Chang, cherished 
the hope that Huo Guang would become Wudi’s successor. For the group around Huo Guang, see Schaab-Hanke 2003/2004: 227f, 239f. It thus seems that while there were 
no imminent political conclusions of the rhetorical tool of allusion used by Sima Qian, in the long run the allusion seems to have worked—at least in the heads of some—a bit 
like a ticking time bomb.
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glossary
benji ᵜ紀
biao li 表㻿
Chunqiu 春秋
Chunqiu fanlu 春秋繁露
ciguan 祠官
Dong Zhongshu 董仲舒
fangshi 方士
feng shan 封禪
Gongyang zhuan ޜ羊傳
Guliang zhuan 穀梁傳
hou 候
Huangdi 黃帝junzi yue 君子曰liezhuan 列傳
mingshan ਽山
Qin Shi Huang 秦始皇
Shiji 史記
shufu 書府
Sima Qian 司馬遷
Sima Tan 司馬談
Taichu ཚ初
taishi gong yue ཚ史ޜ曰
taishi ling ཚ史Ԕ
tianxia yibiao ཙ下儀表
Wu di 武帝xing shuai zhi duan 㠸衰之端
yan 言
yi 意
Yuanfeng 元封zhi Chunqiu 制春秋zhoujin lü 酎金ᖻ
